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their theoretic interest too completely to attempt this; at any rate they did not contest the theoretic superiority of a highest life conceived according to the regulation pattern of Platonic intellectualism. Even the sceptics never dared to doubt that the discovery of intellectual contradictions in the working values of life amounted to a *destruction* of their value. Philosophers simply refused to recognize that human institutions often continue to work in spite of, or even by reason of, the fact that they are infected by what may (abstractly) be represented as self-contradiction. It is only quite recently that men have come to perceive that the fundamental assumptions of Platonic intellectualism are (1) that the source of values must be regarded as transcending human experience; and (2) that the way to secure such ideals is to put them out of relation to that experience. That both these assumptions are utterly false is what we are slowly coming to suspect.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

AN OUTLINE OF THE IDEALISTIC CONSTRUCTION OF EXPERIENCE.

By J. B. Baillie, Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Aberdeen. London: Macmillan & Co.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1906. Pp. xx, 344.

Professor Baillie is already known to philosophical students as the author of a book on Hegel's Logic, from which it became at once apparent that he was a writer of genuine ability who had given a great deal of attention to the works of modern idealists, more particularly to those of Hegel. Some defects were also pretty readily discernible. The exposition was not always lucid; and it was somewhat doubtful whether the views put forward were always quite coherent. The book, however, sufficed to raise the hope in the minds of many readers that Mr. Baillie would before long produce other works of a similar character in which such defects would no longer be apparent. The book now before us to some extent realizes these hopes; but it is to be feared that to a large extent it will prove a disappointment. Like the previous book, it is in the main concerned with the exposition of the Hegelian point of view; and, like the previous book, it is characterized by a deeply sympathetic appreciation of that point of view, as well as by a competent knowledge of other philosophi-

cal positions, and a considerable degree of critical acumen in dealing with them. But the plan of the work is rather too comprehensive to permit of the thorough treatment of any particular points; and one feels, in consequence, that there is a certain vagueness and inconclusiveness throughout. Fundamental difficulties seem often to be rather evaded than solved; and occasionally it is even doubtful whether the doctrines put forward can be regarded as forming a quite coherent whole. Notwithstanding these defects, however—some of which may lie rather in the reviewer than in the author—there can be no doubt that the work is an important contribution to philosophical literature.

The general lines upon which the work proceeds may be briefly indicated. It contains ten chapters, five of which contain the substance of the Shaw Lectures in the University of Edinburgh. The first is introductory; the second discusses Dualism; the third and fourth are concerned with the general nature of experience; the fifth is on sense-experience; the sixth is on "Understanding and the World of Noumena and Phenomena;" the seventh is on "self-conscious experience;" the eighth is on scientific experience; the ninth is on moral experience; and the tenth is on religious experience. The standpoint from which these subjects are dealt with is substantially that of Hegel; and indeed Mr. Baillie seems to have steeped himself so thoroughly in the Hegelian system that considerable parts of his book read rather like a translation from Hegel than like an independent treatise. He certainly adopts the Hegelian manner and phraseology to an extent that is unusual among British idealists; and the significance of the work would in many places be made much clearer if there were some more definite indication as to how much of it is to be regarded as Hegel's and how much as Mr. Baillie's. At the same time, it is evident that a good deal of attention has been given to more recent statements and criticisms of idealistic positions. In particular, Mr. Baillie seems to have been largely influenced by the works of the late Professor Adamson and the writings of some of the Pragmatists. Among the latter he refers more particularly to the logical work of Professor Dewey, who, if he is to be regarded as a Pragmatist, is surely a Pragmatist of a very different type from that represented by Messrs. James and Schiller, just as the late Professor Adamson represented a position very different from that of Messrs. Moore and Russell. On the whole, the chief significance of the work

of Mr. Baillie seems to lie in the attempt to point out "a more excellent way" in idealistic thought than the somewhat half-hearted idealism of Lotze, Bradley, and even Bosanquet. This more excellent way is suggested by the criticisms of such writers as Adamson on the one hand and Dewey on the other, but consists substantially in a return to the more strictly Hegelian position. If something like this is Mr. Baillie's design, the present reviewer is certainly to a very large extent in sympathy with his aim. No writers, it seems to me, are better adapted than Adamson and Dewey to lead by their criticisms to a more adequate conception of what idealism really means; and I think the chief value of such a book as that of Mr. Baillie's is as an indication of the general results to which we might in this way be led. Any student of the critical writings of Adamson and Dewey, or again, of the criticisms of Kant and Lotze given by Caird and Henry Jones, might find it useful to turn to Mr. Baillie's book for a more positive and constructive statement. But it does not seem to me that the statements here given are sufficiently clear, coherent, and cogent to be of the highest value to such a student. The treatment is too dogmatic—occasionally one might almost say oracular—and the difficulties are not sufficiently brought forward and discussed.

It will be seen, from the account given above, that only a comparatively small part of this book falls strictly within the province of a journal of ethics. The last two chapters are those that may be expected to have the most direct interest for our readers. Chapter IX is mainly concerned with the universality of the self as the basis of the social unity. On the more critical side, the inadequacy of the Kantian conception of the moral order is well brought out. But here, as throughout the book, one is conscious of a certain vagueness in the treatment. One wishes that the difficulties involved in the relationship between the individual and society, in the antithesis between moral order and moral progress, and the like, could have been more fully considered.

The concluding chapter is concerned with the various phases in the development of the religious consciousness, in which three main stages are recognized—"The Religion of Nature," "Religion of the Moral Order of Experience," and "Religion of the Spirit." Religion, Mr. Baillie maintains, "is more than morality, and goes beyond moral experience altogether." "In religious life," he

further states, "spirit is not merely all reality, but *the point of view* of the absolute reality is deliberately and consciously *adopted* as an attitude of experience. In religion man places himself at the point of view of God's spirit, and looks, thinks, feels, and acts in the 'sight' or in the 'light' of it." "We must not," however, "suppose that in religion the finite mind suddenly *becomes* God. To be one with God consciously, to take up the position of absolute spirit, is possible without man being God. Man is the religious being, not God. In religion man merely takes up the attitude in which spirit, the supreme reality, is *for* itself: he is at the *point of view* of that spirit; that is all." "Strictly speaking," again, "so far from religion being purely anthropomorphic, it is the sphere where man is really deanthropomorphised. His peculiar characteristics as man are even eliminated altogether." "We must not suppose, further, that religion is one thing and the life of absolute spirit another. The life of absolute spirit appears *just in* religious consciousness. It shows itself to consciousness *quâ* spirit, because itself is spirit, and that is all reality. The consciousness of it is religion. The expression of its content is the active life of absolute spirit. These are merely two sides of the same process, the same phase of experience. Hence, on this view, religion does not so much create the idea of absolute spirit; rather absolute spirit creates the religious life. It appears to the conscious life of spirit."

I have given these passages in Mr. Baillie's own words, because I must confess that this part of his book is one of those that I find it most difficult to make coherent or intelligible. Sometimes I can hardly even follow the grammatical structure of the sentences. For instance, I cannot feel quite sure what is the antecedent of "it" in the last sentence that has been quoted. It seems to me, moreover, that the lack of clearness in expression, both here and in some other places, is not accidental, but is the counterpart of a want of clearness in the view that Mr. Baillie is seeking to set forth. He seems never to have thoroughly considered the question as to the relation between the finite and the infinite in human experience, or in other words, as to the sense in which man is God and the sense in which man is to be distinguished from God. And so far as I can judge, it is the lack of clearness on this point that is mainly responsible for the difficulties that are to be found throughout Mr. Baillie's work.

The closing sentences of the book are, however, even "darker"

than those that I have just quoted. "It is by philosophy that all the processes of experience (religion among them) are constructed. The development of experience as a whole attains its end in the realization of that mode of experience (philosophy) by which all experience has been evolved. The culmination of an absolute idealism is the justification of the idealistic position itself, as the ultimate form of knowledge." This surely would "want a Delian diver."

My impression is, in general, that Mr. Baillie has here been making rather too ambitious an attempt. It is no doubt natural that any writer in whom the constructive impulse is strongly developed should wish to see how the results of philosophic thought look as a whole. But, having once done this, it is to be hoped that Mr. Baillie will now turn his attention to more special problems, and will attempt to develop them with greater clearness of exposition and with a more adequate sense of the difficulties that they involve.

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THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF THE UNIVERSE. By John Denham Parsons, of the Society for Psychical Research. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1906. Pp. 561.

Of this portly volume it seems desirable to give some idea in respect of scope and design, before saying anything as to execution. Forty-two chapters are comprised in its seven parts. These latter include treatment of such topics as definitions of soul, substance, life, future hope, relations of body and mind, the resurrection, reincarnation theories; present day facts as to the material universe; psychical research; and general conclusions as to man's place and pilgrimage. It will thus be seen that the work represents a large amount of varied reading, besides much thinking. Many good things are to be found in it, albeit it contains things that are odd and fantastic. The worst thing, perhaps, about the work is its style, which does the treatment grave injustice. Sentences interminable and involved, requiring, as often in German translations, to be split up into three, are of continual recurrence. But this drawback must not be allowed to detract from ap-